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Ambacher: Lienhard Wawrzyn: Der Blaue. Das Spitzelsystem der DDR
Lest the western German reader feel he is totally free of
what he considers to be reprehensible behavior on the part
of his former eastern adversary, Wawrzyn reminds his readers
of the "Radikalenerlaß" and its poisoning of the atmosphere
in the other part of the formerly divided nation, the Federal
Republic.
This rather slender volume was quite interesting and
provides the general observer of German culture with a good
background by way of introduction to the public debate
concerning the Stasi and its former members and informers.

Wawrzyn, Lienhard. Der Blaue: Das Spitzelsystem der DDR.
Verlag Klaus Wagenbach: Berlin, 1990. D M 15.
While Germans as a whole suffered under the 12-year
reign of the National Socialists, those living in the later GDR
endured another 44 years under the Soviet occupation and its
successor. During this time, the existence of the secret police
was all-pervasive, whether agents of the Gestapo or the Stasi
were physically present or not. Lienhard Wawrzyn contends
that one cannot begin to understand life in the GDR until one
has investigated the phenomenon of the "Spitzel," the informer, also known as "Der Blaue," a nickname coined from
the color of his/her files in the government's record-keeping
system. Wawrzyn estimates that altogether some 500,000
informers served the regime at one time or another during the
40 years of its existence, i.e. one out of every 30 men, women,
and children.
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Wichner, Ernst und Herbert Wiesner (Hrsg.). Zensur in der
DDR. Geschichte, Praxis und "Ästhetik" der Behinderung von
Literatur. Ausstellungsbuch. Literaturhaus Berlin, 1991.
200 S.

These agents themselves assumed a second name and
with it a second identity, in most cases unknown to others,
even close family members and friends. Like almost all
citizens of the GDR, they spoke two languages as well: one
public, expressing their loyalty to the state, and one private.
With the system of the informer, however, one could never
be sure when one could employ this private speech. The
informer could be anyone, and everyone had to be constantly
on guard. The psychology of this informer-system, in
Wawrzyn's view, created a climate of distrust among the
people, undermined their loyalty to the state, and contributed
in the end to the collapse of that state.

Die Ausstellung "Zensur in der DDR," die vom 17. März bis
1. Mai 1991 im Literaturhaus Berlin und vom 15. Mai bis 29.
Juni 1991 im Literaturhaus Frankfurt a. M . zu sehen bzw. zu
lesen war, ist durch ein Ausstellungsbuch vorzüglich
dokumentiert worden. Wie Herbert Wiesner, einer der beiden
Herausgeber, in seinem Vorwort "Zensiert - Gefördert Verhindert" anmerkt, ist es mehr "als ein Katalog von
Exponaten, [es] zitiert die Dokumente meist ausführlicher
und stellt sie in einen gegenüber der Ausstellung erweiterten
Kontext aus Quellen und Originalbeiträgen zum Thema der
Zensur, die Schriftsteller der ehemaligen DDR für diesen
Ausstellungskatalog geschrieben haben" (13).
Die mehr oder weniger subtilen Mechanismen der "Druckgenehmigungspraxis," die Maßregelung von Autoren, der
Entzug des Reiseprivilegs, Einschränkung oder Verbot der
Buchwerbung, Rückstufung von Ausstattungsqualität und
Auflagenhöhe bis hin zu bestellten Rezensionsinhalten und
die mit drohendem Unterton nahegelegten Verhaltensanweisungen mit westdeutschen Interviewern zeigen das Netz
der kulturpolitischen Lenkung, das u.a. auf einer irrationalen
Angst vor dem gedruckten Wort basiert. Wie auch immer
geartete, sogar konstruktive Kritik an den bestehenden
Verhältnissen konnte ja "vom Klassenfeind gegen den
Sozialismus" verwendet werden.
Auf dem X. Schriftstellerkongreß vom 24. - 27. November
1987 wurden von Günter de Bruyn und Christoph Hein
scharfe Reden gegen die im offiziellen Sprachgebrauch
niemals "Zensur" genannten "Druckgenehmigungsverfahren"
gehalten—Hein sprach über ihre Überlebtheit, Nutzlosigkeit,
Paradoxic, Menschen- und Volksfeindlichkeit, Ungesetzlichkeit und Strafbarkeit (34). Nichtsdestoweniger hatte z. B.
Therese Hörnigks Christa Wolf- Monographie zum 60.
Geburtstag der Schriftstellerin (2 Jahre nach dem
Schriftstellerkongreß!) Probleme zu erscheinen, was nicht
zum Ruhm des Verlages Volk und Wissen beiträgt, der selbst
auch zu den zensierten Zensoren (75ff) gehörte.
Was die Zensurmechanismen bei vielen Autoren bewirkten,
beschreiben Joachim Seyppel mit dem Begriff "Porzellanhund"
(25) und Joachim Walther mit der Paraphrase "Jacken, die ich
in den Text gehängt hatte" (26)—Selbstdisziplinierung,
Selbstzensur, eine Schere im Kopf, die schon vorher die
"gefährlichen Stellen" wegschnitt, Ablenkungsmanöver, um
die Aufmerksamkeit der Zensoren auf plakative "Frechheiten"

In this investigation, which consists of introductory material, a number of case histories and various related items (such
as a lexicon of Stasi speech, a description of operations
procedures, etc.), Wawrzyn is concerned with three major
questions: 1) Who were the informers and what did they
experience? 2) What made them work for the Stasi? 3) Who
were their superiors and what role did they play? He also
divides the informers into four groups: the adventurers, the
cunning, the adaptable, and the experts. Many of these
people worked in public occupations, such as waiters or cabdrivers, and some, such as physicians, even came from
professional areas. They were, for the most part, forced to
become informers as a result of threats; others were w o n
over, however, by promises of a better material life.
The process of becoming an informer had been made
easier by the educational system, which was aimed from the
beginning at the creation of a totally submissive society. No
matter what his background or educational experience might
be, the informer was, by and large, despised by the very
people w h o directed him, although in time some informers
and their superiors in the Stasi did establish a close relationship. In order to alleviate the internal contradictions resulting
from their positions, most informers sought to convince
themselves that they were serving a noble cause.
In drawing his conclusion, Wawrzyn lists three insights he
has gained from this investigation: 1) He finds state spysystems to be expensive, ineffective and outmoded. 2) He is
now aware that people are capable of what he calls the
"aufrichtige Lüge." 3) He is convinced that the citizens of the
former G D R will never see their files, especially since the
eastern political parties were absorbed as blocs, resulting in
the presence of former Stasi-agents in the political and
governmental systems of the reunited nation. Germans in
high places, whether in Bonn or Berlin, have little if any
desire to lift the veil of secrecy from the face of the Stasi.
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